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I. INTRODUCTION
Internal Revenue Code section 162(a)(1), hereinafter referred to as section 162,
limits an employer’s income tax deduction for salaries or other compensation paid or
301
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accrued to a “reasonable allowance”1 for services “actually rendered.”2  When an 
amount paid is in excess of a reasonable allowance, a question arises as to the proper 
characterization of the non-deductible portion.  The courts have been inconsistent in 
their treatment of this “unreasonable” amount.  Sometimes they have recharacterized 
the payment as something other than compensation,3 while at other times they have 
been unwilling to recharacterize the payment, claiming that the employer is bound by 
the original form of his transaction.4
Case law abounds with decisions testing the amount of compensation deducted 
based on a two-pronged standard of 1) reasonable amount and 2) compensatory 
intent. 5   If the properly deducted amount has been determined by the Internal 
Revenue Service or the courts to be less than the originally deducted amount, then 
the proper characterization of the non-deductible portion, both as to the payer and as 
to the recipient, must be determined.  Courts have recharacterized the payment as 
either a dividend,6 a gift,7 or as a payment for property,8 invoking the doctrine of 
“substance over form.”9  The courts generally have been hesitant, however, to permit 
a taxpayer to assert a substance over form argument to recharacterize the disallowed 
deduction as something other than compensation.10  More often, they hold that the 
taxpayer is bound by the original form of his transaction.11  The courts’ concern has 
been the inappropriateness of tax benefits that might result from a characterization 
other than that originally chosen.  They argue that: 
                                                                
1I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 2001) (“In general.—There shall be allowed as a deduction all 
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on 
any trade or business, including—a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation 
for personal services actually rendered.”). 
2Id.
3E.g., Montgomery Eng’g Co. v. United States, 344 F.2d 996, 997 (3d Cir. 1965). 
4E.g., Smith v. Manning, 189 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1951); Sterno Sales Corp. v. United 
States, 345 F.2d 552, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
5I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 2001).  This two-pronged standard is based on the “reasonable 
allowance” and “actually rendered” language contained herein. 
6Kennedy v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 793, 806 (1979), rev’d, Kennedy v. Commission, 671 
F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1982). 
7Thomas v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 378, 379 (5th Cir. 1943). 
8Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 403-405 (1965), aff’d, 373 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.
1967) (holding that payments for services to construct an asset with a useful life of more than 
one year are capitalized as part of the asset’s cost). 
9E.g., Kennedy, 72 T.C. at 806.  See generally, Robert Thornton Smith, Substance and 
Form: A Taxpayer’s Right to Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 TAX LAW. 137, 172-173 
(1990) (“Is a taxpayer allowed greater freedom to assert the priority of substance over form 
principle after a service deficiency determination?  The answer would seem to depend upon 
whether the Service itself asserts substance over form.”). 
10Smith v. Manning, 189 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1951); Sterno Sales Corp. v. United 
States, 345 F.2d 552, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
11Smith, 189 F.2d at 345; Sterno Sales Corp, 345 F.2d at 554.
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[A] taxpayer must normally accept the tax consequences of the way in 
which he deliberately chooses to cast his transactions (although the 
Internal Revenue Service may not be bound by his choice) . . . .  It would 
be quite intolerable to pyramid the existing complexities of tax law by a 
rule that the tax shall be that resulting from the form of the transaction 
taxpayers have chosen or from any other form they might have chosen, 
whichever is less.12
In other cases, courts have chosen not to recharacterize the unreasonable 
payment.13  Thus, the payment retains its character as compensation by both the 
payer and the recipient.  Since it is in excess of reasonable compensation, it is non-
deductible by the payer;14 nonetheless, it is taxable to the recipient.15  Furthermore, it 
remains subject to the full gamut of payroll taxes,16 most notably FICA and Medicare 
taxes.17
The deduction limitation of section 162 has been applied historically in a manner 
that illuminates a singular purpose, that is, to unveil payments of a non-
compensatory nature that have been disguised as compensation to create a tax 
benefit.18  The Internal Revenue Service and the courts have used appropriate self-
restraint in limiting the application of this section to those situations where 
compensatory intent is suspect due to a relationship between the payer and the payee 
that is not completely arms’ length.19  To do otherwise would be contrary to the 
notion of “free enterprise,” i.e., “[a] private and consensual system of production and 
distribution, usually conducted for a profit in a competitive environment that is 
relatively free of governmental interference.”20  Rarely has a payment to a non-
                                                                
12Sterno Sales Corp, 345 F.2d at 554 (citing Television Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 
F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1960)). 
13Smith, 189 F.2d at 348-349; Willke v. Commissioner, 12 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1942);  
Estate of Kartsen v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 1042 (1954); Sterno Sales Corp., 345 
F.2d at 554; But see Garrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 281 (1969) (allowing taxpayer’s 
amended return after audit adjustment which disallowed deduction for unreasonable 
compensation; and permitting character change to liquidation distribution because taxpayer 
did not sustain his compensation argument). 
14I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 2001). 
15I.R.C. § 61 (West 2001). 
16I.R.C. § 3121(a)-(b) (West 2001) (defining wages and employment for F.I.C.A. and 
Medicare tax purposes). 
17I.R.C. § 3101(a)-(b) (West 2001) (imposing F.I.C.A.taxes; § 3101(a) imposing old-age, 
survivors and disability insurance; § 3101(b) imposing hospital (medicare) insurance). 
18Andrew W. Stumpff, The Reasonable Compensation Rule, 19 VA. TAX REV. 371, 380 
(1999).
19See generally GERALD A KAFKA, ESQ., Reasonable Compensation, 390-2d BNA TAX
MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, A-5 (1998) (“Virtually all challenges by the IRS to the deductibility of 
compensation have occurred in the context of salary arrangements between related parties 
involving either dealings between corporations and shareholders or relatives of shareholders, 
or dealings between partners or proprietors and their relatives.”). 
20BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 675 (7th ed. 1999). 
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related party, paid in good faith as compensation, been rendered non-deductible 
solely due to a disagreement as to the reasonableness of amount.  Such a 
disallowance would be tantamount to a governmentally imposed business judgment 
made by those who are less familiar with the intricacies of the business than its 
owners.21  We accept a limited degree of governmental intervention in business 
operations to address public policy concerns.  An example is legislation creating 
presumptive unreasonableness of certain compensation of executives of large, 
publicly traded corporations through the “golden parachute” provisions of Internal 
Revenue Code section 280G and the deduction limitation for executive pay of 
Internal Revenue Code section 162(m).  These provisions were designed to protect 
the conflicting interests of shareholders.  The widespread intervention of the 
government in employee salary decisions, however, stifles the small businessman’s 
ability to control the success or failure of his enterprise. 
Equity demands that this disguise of compensation be undone through 
recharacterization.  “If such payments are not true compensation, they must, of 
course, be treated as what they actually are,”22 and the tax consequences of the 
restated characterization should fall accordingly.  In other words, a “constructive 
correcting journal entry” is required to reclassify the original transaction as it would 
be had the reasonableness determination been made at the time of payment.   
To tie the taxpayer to his original characterization only because it was his 
originally asserted characterization paves the way to unjust enrichment.  Payroll tax 
liabilities remain attached to payments that are considered too large to be reasonable 
compensation. 23   The recipient’s treatment as compensation income could be 
inappropriate if the payment were truly in the nature of a gift or a dividend.  If the 
payment were made by an S corporation, a payment of a dividend could be non-
taxable.24  Likewise, a dividend payment from a C corporation might properly be 
characterized as a non-taxable return of capital or a capital gain.25  Furthermore, the 
payment could be a constructive dividend to the owners followed by a gift to the 
recipient, thus triggering transfer tax consequences.26
When the government is unwilling to recharacterize the transaction based on its  
subsequent determination of unreasonableness, the taxpayer is irrevocably bound by 
his original characterization that was based on his judgment of reasonableness.  
Because the determination of reasonable amount is a valuation issue based on the 
particular facts and circumstances at hand,27 it is a highly subjective determination,28
                                                                
21Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999). 
22Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 552, 556 (Ct. Cl. 1965);  Garrison v. 
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 281 (1969). 
23I.R.C. § 3121(a)-(b) (West 2001). 
24I.R.C. § 1368(b)(1); I.R.C. § 1368(c)(1) (West 2001) (explaining tax free distribution to 
extent of accumulated adjustment account). 
25I.R.C. § 301(c) (West 2001).  
26I.R.C. § 2501 (West 2001) (imposing gift tax). 
27Mayson Mfg. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (“The situation must be considered as 
a whole with no single factor decisive.”). 
28Kennedy v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d 167, 176 (6th Cir. 1982). 
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one in which the good faith judgments of the government and of the taxpayer are 
likely to differ.29  The taxpayer could not reasonably be expected to predict the 
government’s determination at the time of the original transaction.30  Therefore, his 
assertion of a substance over form argument characterizing his payment differently 
from his original treatment is justified by his new knowledge of the government’s 
binding determination of a reasonable amount. 
This note identifies the inequities inherent in the failure to recharacterize 
unreasonable compensation payments and proposes that the taxpayer be allowed to 
present evidence of an alternative characterization after the government determines a 
reasonable allowance. 
Part I of this note demonstrates the historical applications of section 162 
supporting a purpose of challenging payments disguised as compensation with an 
accompanying tax advantage.  It will explore the legislative history and statutory 
implications, as well as applications in case law.  Part II explains the highly 
subjective character of the determination of reasonableness and explores the 
numerous dimensions of that judgment.  Part III explains the impact of that 
subjective determination in the formulation of intents, i.e., the intent to compensate 
and the intent to make a gift.  Part IV deals with the issues surrounding 
recharacterization as constructive dividends.  Part V compares the section 162 
limitation on deductible compensation to other statutory provisions limiting the 
deduction for compensation 31  and distinguishes the statutory purpose of such 
limitations in the publicly traded setting from the section 162 limitation in the 
closely-held setting.  Part VI integrates the findings to conclude that there is an 
equitable demand for recharacterization and an entitlement of the taxpayer to present 
evidence of an alternative characterization. 
II. HISTORICAL VIEW OF SECTION 162 AND ITS APPLICATION IN CASE LAW
The purpose of section 162 is to allow employers to deduct salary payments that 
are reasonable. Conversely, deductions for unreasonable salary payments must be 
disallowed.  Thus, the intent of imposing such a limitation on deductibility is to 
challenge payments that have been disguised as compensation to achieve a tax 
advantage.  This intent has been defined both by the language of the Internal 
Revenue Code and regulations, and by the circumstances under which the Internal 
Revenue Service and the courts have made reasonable compensation challenges. 
A.  Statutory Provisions 
The Revenue Acts of 1913 and 1916 only generally mentioned the allowance of 
deductions that were “ordinary and necessary expenses.”32  The regulations under the 
                                                                
29Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999). 
30Id.
31I.R.C. § 280G (West 2001) (golden parachute payments);  I.R.C.§ 162(m) (West 2001) 
(limiting to $1,000,000 deduction for compensation payments by certain large corporations). 
32KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-1 (citing Revenue Act of 1913 § G(b)[2] (First); Revenue 
Act of 1916, § 12(a) (First)). 
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Revenue Act of 1916, however, supported a restrictive purpose.33 They warned of the 
need to carefully analyze payments to officers or employees who were stockholders 
that were out of proportion to business volume or excessive when compared to 
similarly situated employees in other companies.34  The regulations required that “the 
amount so paid in excess of reasonable compensation for the services will not be 
deductible from gross income, but will be treated as a distribution of profits.”35 Thus, 
regulations mandated recharacterization of unreasonable compensation that is truly 
in the nature of a dividend. 
The Revenue Act of 1918 was the first codification containing language 
permitting a deduction for “a reasonable allowance for salaries or other 
compensation.”36  The legislative history does not indicate why the Act expanded its 
language from the former “ordinary and necessary.”  One theory is that the intent 
was to expand deductible compensation to negate the detrimental effect of the excess 
profits tax of 1917.37  It gave the taxpayer the ability to deduct a reasonable amount 
of compensation, even if such compensation was not actually paid.38
The expanded directives of current Treasury Regulations focus even more clearly 
on the heightened scrutiny mandated for related party transactions.  In its example of 
practical application, Treasury Regulation section 1.162-7(b)(1) points to the 
possibility that a payment designated as compensation is likely not to be the purchase 
price for services where “a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of 
whom draw salaries,” makes payments “that bear a close relationship to the 
stockholdings of the officers or employees.”39  In such cases, it would seem likely 
that “the excessive payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock.”40
In addition, section 1.162-7(b)(2) invites scrutiny of contingent payments.  
Contingent payments are tied to the employee’s productivity. They provide an 
incentive to the employee, in that the harder he works, the more compensation he 
receives.  Although these payments must be scrutinized as potential dividends, a 
deduction is permitted for contingent payments that are greater than ordinarily 
acceptable amounts when they stem from arms’ length bargains.   
                                                                
33Id. (citing Griswald, New Light on a Reasonable Allowance for Salaries, 59 HARV. L.
REV. 286 (1945)). 
34Id. (citing Regs. 33 (revised, 1918), Art. 138). 
35Id. (citing Regs. 33 (revised, 1918), Art. 138). 
36Id. (citing Revenue Act of 1918 §§ 214(a)(I) and 234(a)(I)). 
37KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-1 (citing Revenue Act of 1918 §§ 214(a)(I) and 234(a)(I)). 
38Id.
39Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1) (1960).  Language is added in the current regulation to the 
original 1916 version noting that a correlation between excess salary payments and 
stockholdings might indicate a distribution of earnings rather than a salary payment.  It also 
cautions that payment of salary might really be a payment for property, where a partnership 
sells out to a corporation and the former partners continue in the service of the corporation.  
Id.
40Id.
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“[I]f contingent compensation is paid pursuant to a free bargain between 
the employer and the individual made before the services are rendered, 
not influenced by any consideration on the part of the employer other than 
that of securing on fair and advantageous terms the services of an 
individual, it should be allowed as a deduction . . . .”41
In this situation, the true character of the payment is likely compensatory, and as 
such, the payment is deductible despite being somewhat excessive.  
Thus, Treasury Regulation section 1.162-7 not only invites scrutiny of related 
party transactions with an eye toward inappropriate characterization, but also defends 
transactions such as contingent salary made in good faith with the intent to 
compensate. These factors combine to define a purpose to view transactions in their 
true character.  Treasury Regulation section 1.162-8 accomplishes this purpose by 
mandating recharacterization of ostensible salary payments truly in the nature of a 
dividend or the purchase price for property.42
B.  Case Law 
Virtually all challenges to compensation deductions occur within the context of 
related party payments.43  These relationships include those between the owner of a 
business in his individual capacity and the business entity itself, and between the 
owner of a business and his family members.44 The level of scrutiny accorded to 
these transactions tends to be proportional to the closeness of the relationships 
between the parties.45
The amount of stock owned by an employee is highly relevant in assessing 
whether bargaining is done at arms’ length.  An individual who owns only a small 
amount of stock is likely to bargain with his employer at arm’s length.46  Thus, the 
heightened scrutiny accorded to officer-stockholders diminishes when the employee 
lacks a controlling interest or owns no stock at all.47
                                                                
41Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2) (1960). 
42Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1960).  In instances other than in section 162, the Internal 
Revenue Code itself contemplates dividend payments disguised as salary.  For example, 
foreign earned income is defined within the Code as excluding “that part of the compensation 
derived by the taxpayer for personal services rendered by him to a corporation which 
represents a distribution of earnings and profits rather than a reasonable allowance as 
compensation for services actually rendered.”  I.R.C. § 911(d)(2)(A) (West 2001) (defining 
earned income for former I.R.C. § 1348; i.e., maximum tax on earned income). 
43KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-5. 
44Id.
45E.g., Northlich Stolley, Inc. v. United States, 368 F.2d 272, 278 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Kropf v. 
United States, 543 F. Supp. 581, 581 (D. Colo. 1982). 
46See generally, KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-5. 
47E.g., Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 833 (7th Cir. 1999).  A 
substantial factor in support of the reasonableness of compensation paid to the 55% owner  
was the approval of other owners whose economic positions were diminished by payment of 
his bonus. Id.  “The fact that Heitz’s salary was approved by the other owners of the 
corporation . . . goes far to rebut any inference of bad faith here . . . .”  Id. at 839. 
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Payments to owners’ family members have been successfully challenged as 
unreasonable where the owner held a controlling interest, the family relationship was 
as close as spouse, former spouse, or children, and there was insufficient evidence to 
support the extent of services provided.48  The determination to be made is whether 
the employer is exercising free and independent judgment in his salary 
determinations.49  Factors to consider in addition to the closeness of the family 
relationship are whether the family member is adult and whether he is free to 
negotiate his own terms.50
Although the case of Patton v. Commissioner supports the notion that an 
adjustment for unreasonable compensation can be made for payments to an unrelated 
taxpayer, its strength as a precedent is weak. 51   In Patton, the party to whom 
unreasonable payments were made was neither an owner nor a relative of an owner, 
but rather an elderly, favored employee.  Although he was not a related party in the 
sense of actual family, a strong personal relationship that evolved over many years of 
employment made the transaction less than arms’ length.52
The intent of the restriction to reasonableness of section 162, to unveil non-
compensatory payments disguised as compensation, is supported both by 1) the 
consistency with which section 162 has been applied to payments to related parties in 
closely-held businesses, and 2) the notable absence of cases involving payments 
made by large, publicly-traded corporations. 53   Although large corporations can 
make excessive salary payments, they are not attacked through section 162(a) 
because the character of the payments as compensation is not subject to dispute.  The 
excessive payments lack the potential to be reclassified as dividends due to the strict 
uniformity of dividend payments made by a publicly-held corporation.  The 
payments are restricted, however, through the provisions of sections 280G and 
162(m). Challenges through section 162(a) have been reserved for closely held 
businesses, in which the owner can determine both the amounts and the 
characterizations of payments to employees.  This attests to the function of section 
162(a) as a vehicle to scrutinize the proper characterization of a transaction. 
The incidence of section 162 challenges to subchapter S corporation54 payments 
are relatively infrequent and limited to special situations in which there is a potential 
tax increase accompanying an adjustment.55 Generally, by its failure to pursue S 
                                                                
48Summitt Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 833 (1990);  Eller v. 
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 934, 962-964 (1981);  Graham v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1315, 1322 (1976). 
49Harolds Club v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1965). 
50Id. (determining that the fact that sons of the controlling owner were adult and free to 
negotiate their own terms minimizes the significance of the relationship in evaluating whether 
the employer was exercising free and independent judgment). 
51See generally, KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-5. 
52Patton v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 482 (1947), aff’d 168 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1948). 
53See generally, KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-5. 
54I.R.C. § 1361(a)-(b) (West 2001).  Section 1361(a) defines an S corporation; section 
1361(b) lists its qualifications.  One of the qualifications, that an S corporation must have 75 
or fewer shareholders, differentiates it from a large, publicly traded corporation.  Id.
55KAFKA, supra note 19, at A36-37. 
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corporation reasonable compensation issues, the Internal Revenue Service 
acknowledges a distinguishing aspect of S corporations.  That is, due to the lack of 
inherent double taxation applicable to C corporation dividends, an S corporation 
owner has no tax avoidance purpose to achieve by overcompensating himself or 
other owners. 
Because dividend payments by an S corporation, unlike a C corporation,56 are 
often tax-free to the shareholder, 57  recharacterization of an unreasonable salary 
payment as a distribution to an owner of an S corporation does not generate tax 
revenue for the government.  Rather, the unreasonable compensation produces two 
offsetting adjustments.  First, the unreasonable salary expense is removed as a 
deduction, 58  increasing the shareholder’s flow-through income by that amount.  
Second, compensation income is reduced by the unreasonable portion.  The 
unreasonable compensation was transformed through recharacterization to generally 
non-taxable dividend income, 59  non-taxable because the corporation was an S 
corporation.  An additional adjustment would be a reduction in payroll tax liabilities, 
due to the reduction in compensation income.  This payroll tax reduction generates a 
net loss of revenue to the government; therefore, needless to say, this is a path rarely 
taken.  This result differs from the recharacterization of unreasonable C corporation 
compensation expense because C corporation dividends are generally taxable to the 
recipient.
Conversely, if the unreasonable compensation of an S corporation shareholder 
were not recharacterized as a distribution, but rather retained its original 
characterization as non-deductible compensation, the flow-through income to the 
shareholder would be increased by the non-deductible portion of the compensation 
expense, but compensation income would remain the same.  The unreasonable 
portion would effectively become doubly taxed.  This is the same net effect as a 
recharacterization of C corporation unreasonable compensation as a dividend.60 In 
this case, recharacterized dividend income is taxable to the recipient to the extent 
that it is paid out of the corporation’s earnings and profits,61  while the dividend 
payment by the corporation is non-deductible.  This again results in double taxation, 
but this time without the reduction in payroll tax liabilities that accompanies 
recharacterization. 
Although the determination of S corporation unreasonable compensation without 
recharacterization as a distribution would result in increased revenue for the 
                                                                
56I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2) (explaining that a corporation without an effective S election is a C 
corporation, taxed under the provisions of I.R.C. § 301). 
57I.R.C. § 1368(b)(1); I.R.C. § 1368(c)(1) (explaining tax free distribution to extent of 
AAA). 
58I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 2001). 
59I.R.C. § 1368(b)(1); I.R.C. § 1368(c)(1) (explaining tax free distribution to extent of 
AAA). 
60 E.g., Kennedy v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 793, 806 (1979), rev’d, Kennedy v. 
Commissioner, 671 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1982). 
61 I.R.C. § 312 (West 2001) (explaining calculation and adjustments to earnings and 
profits).
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government, these challenges have generally not been made.62  This attests not only 
to a presumption of recharacterization, but also to an intent to unveil payments 
disguised as compensation to gain a tax benefit.  In the original transaction, the S 
corporation shareholder has no incentive (other than as to allocation issues among 
the shareholders) to make excessive compensation payments, because whatever 
amount paid is both deductible expense and includible income.  In addition, larger 
salary payments cost more in payroll taxes.  Therefore, because the incentive to 
overcompensate is non-existent, S corporation compensation is rarely scrutinized. 
S corporation challenges are limited to two types.  The first occurred between 
1970 and 1981, when Internal Revenue Code section 1348 provided a maximum tax 
on earned income, limiting the top marginal rate on earned income to 50 percent.63
Reasonableness of compensation was challenged to determine whether the top 
marginal rate was properly limited to 50 percent, or whether the higher marginal 
rates, up to 70 percent for unearned income, were applicable.64  This 20 percent 
marginal gap created a significant tax consequence in the determination of 
reasonable compensation.65  Recharacterization of compensation income as dividend 
income was required to carry out the purpose of the inquiry, i.e., to subject only a 
reasonable amount of compensation income to the preferential rates of section 1348. 
The second S corporation challenge has been to unreasonably low compensation.
Lower than reasonable compensation avoids the payroll tax liabilities that would 
attach to reasonable compensation.  To generate appropriate payroll tax revenue, the 
Internal Revenue Service has issued Revenue Rulings mandating that S corporation 
dividends paid in lieu of reasonable compensation be treated as compensation.66
These provide yet another example of a mandate to recharacterize a transaction to its 
true nature. Furthermore, they are exceptional circumstances in which an S 
corporation owner could manipulate salary payments to achieve a tax benefit. 
The purpose of section 162 has been defined by language in the Internal Revenue 
Code, Treasury Regulations, and Revenue Rulings, warning 1) of ostensible 
payments of salary that are truly not compensatory,67 2) of the need to determine 
whether payments are in the nature of a dividend68 or compensation,69 and 3) of the 
special scrutiny needed for related party transactions.70   The purpose is further 
defined by case law that only challenged payments to related parties in the closely-
held business environment where a disguised characterization can cause tax 
                                                                
62KAFKA, supra note 19, at A36-37. 
63I.R.C. § 1348 (West 2001) (repealed by P.L. 97-34 § 101(c)(1) for tax years beginning 
after December 31, 1981). 
64I.R.C. § 1 (West 1979); Schiff v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 659 (1980). 
65Trucks, Inc. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 638, 641 (D. Neb. 1984). 
66Radtke v. United States, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990); Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 
287 (1974); Rev. Rul. 73-361, 1973-2 C.B. 331 (1973).  
67I.R.C. § 911 (West 2001); Treas. Reg. §1.162-7 (1960). 
68I.R.C. § 911; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7. 
69Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287 (1974); Rev. Rul. 73-361, 1973-2 C.B. 331 (1973). 
70Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7. 
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avoidance.71  The general absence of S corporation cases implies an acknowledgment 
by the government of the likelihood that the excess compensation payment could 
truly be tax-free dividends.  Thus, in the absence of a tax avoidance intent in 
disguising payments to create a tax benefit, and without a potential tax increase, the 
Internal Revenue has generally chosen not to attack S corporation compensation.72
Combined statutory history and case law support the singular purpose of 
rendering payments disguised as compensation for the purpose of obtaining a tax 
benefit non-deductible.  This is a much narrower purpose than that found in the strict 
construction of Treasury Regulation section 1.162-7, which, by requiring both a 
reasonable amount and an intent to compensate, permits disallowance of any 
compensation payments determined to be either unreasonable in amount or not 
intended to compensate. 73   Thus, although strict construction permits the 
disallowance of innocently excessive compensation payments resulting from 
discrepancies in business judgments, the historic attack has been confined to 
intentionally disguised payments.  
III. THE HIGHLY SUBJECTIVE DETERMINATION OF REASONABLE AMOUNT 
The concept of reasonableness “defies simple interpretation by tax experts in the 
same manner that the legendary reasonable man escapes precise definition by 
negligence lawyers and the concept of reasonable doubt remains an elusive factor in 
the criminal law.”74   The determination of how much salary is reasonable in a 
particular set of facts and circumstances is a valuation issue and is highly 
subjective.75  Despite the use of certain objective tools such as empirical data and 
company financial information to ascertain value, personal judgment is needed to 
weigh the importance of the valuation criteria and to analyze the strength of 
comparisons to other companies. 76   The Sixth Circuit noted in Kennedy v. 
Commissioner that “[t]he determination of reasonable compensation under section 
162(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code is more nearly an art than a science.”77  This 
comment was appropriate to a case where large discrepancies in reasonable amount 
                                                                
71KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-5, A37-38. 
72Id. at A37-38. 
73Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7.  According to the regulation: 
There may be included among the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in 
carrying on any trade or business a reasonable allowance for salaries or other 
compensation for personal services actually rendered.  The test of deductibility in the 
case of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are in fact 
payments purely for services. 
Id.
74KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-2. 
75Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999). 
76Id.
77Kennedy v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing Bertozzi, Compensation 
Policy for the Closely-held Corporation:  The Constraint of Reasonableness, 16 Am. Bus. L.J. 
157, 186 (1978)). 
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determinations existed between the Internal Revenue allowance, the Tax Court 
allowance, and the court of appeals allowance.78
A.  Multi-Factor Tests 
The Tax Court79 and various appellate circuits developed multi-factor tests to 
standardize the criteria for reasonable compensation determinations.80 Mayson Mfg. 
v. Commissioner lists nine factors used in the Sixth Circuit:  1) Employee 
qualifications, 2) Nature, extent and scope of employee’s work, 3) Size and 
complexities of business, 4) Comparison of salaries paid to gross and net income, 5) 
Prevailing general economic conditions, 6) Comparison of salaries paid with 
distributions to stockholders, 7) Prevailing rates of compensation for comparable 
positions in comparable companies, 8) Salary policy of employer as to all 
employees, and 9) Amount of compensation paid to the particular employee in 
previous years.81  Variations on the Mayson Mfg. v. Commissioner theme appear in 
the holdings of various courts 82 that used factor tests incorporating up to 21 factors.83
The flaws in the use of multi-factor tests have been expounded by the courts 
advocating the “independent investor test” approach to determining reasonableness.84
In Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit enumerates five 
drawbacks of multi-factor tests.  First, the tests are non-directive as to how to weigh 
conflicting, often vague factors.85  Second, the factors do not clearly relate to the 
purpose of the restrictive reasonableness requirement of section 162, i.e., “to prevent 
dividends (or in some cases gifts), that are not deductible from corporate income, 
from being disguised as salary.”86  Third, the courts lack the expertise to act as a 
superpersonnel department for closely held corporations: 
                                                                
78Id. at 177.  In 1973, the IRS allowance was $108,000.00, the Tax Court allowance was 
$190,000.00, and the appeals court allowance was $332,365.68 (full amount claimed).  In 
1974, the IRS allowance was $120,000.00, the Tax Court allowance was $220,000.00, and the 
appeals court allowance was $301,345.00 (full amount claimed).  Id.
79 E.g., Normandie Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1738 
(2000) (five factors). 
80E.g., O.S.C. & Assoc., Inc. v. Commissioner, 187 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) (four 
factors); Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) (seven 
factors); Alpha Medical Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 F.3d 942, 946 (6th Cir. 1999) (nine factors); 
Dexsil Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1998) (five factors); Donald Palmer 
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1869 (1995), aff’d 84 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(nine factors); Elliott’s, Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245-1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (five 
factors). 
81Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949). 
82E.g., Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir. 1987); Edwin’s, Inc. 
v. United States, 501 F.2d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1974). 
83Foos v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 863, 878-879 (1981) (using 21 factors). 
84Exacto Spring Corp., 196 F.3d at 835. 
85Id.
86Id.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss2/7
2004] UNREASONABLE COMPENSATION 313
The test . . . invites the court to decide what the taxpayer’s employees 
should be paid on the basis of the judges’ own ideas of what jobs are 
comparable, what relation an employee’s salary should bear to the 
corporation’s net earnings, what types of business should pay abnormally 
high (or low) salaries, and so forth.  The judges of the Tax Court are not 
equipped by training or experience to determine the salaries of corporate 
officers; no judges are.87
Fourth, the non-directive character of the test generates arbitrary results “based on 
uncanalized discretion or unprincipled rules of thumb.”88  Fifth, the unpredictability 
of the determination of reasonableness forces running the risk of determining salaries 
that may be “indispensable to the success of their business.”89
B.  Independent Investor Test 
Due to these inherent drawbacks, courts of appeal have moved toward the use of 
an “independent investor test.”90   The independent investor test is satisfied if a 
disinterested  investor would approve the salary payment, evaluating the remaining 
return on investment and the potential for dividends after payment of the salary.91
Courts have used the independent investor test in conjunction with multi-factor 
tests,92 sometimes referring to the independent investor test as “a lens through which 
the entire analysis should be viewed.”93 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner
dismisses that view as a formality, stating that “[t]he new test dissolves the old and 
returns the inquiry to basics.”94  The Seventh Circuit has held that to the extent that a 
company’s higher than reasonably expected return on investment is attributable to 
the efforts of a single employee, his salary is presumptively reasonable.95  It has 
embraced an “indirect market test,”96 which justifies the salary of an employee paid 
to manage the company’s assets by his success in increasing their value.97
                                                                
87Id.
88Id.
89Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999). 
90Id. at 838 (citing Dexsil Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1998); Rapco Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 85 F.3d 950, 954-955 (2d Cir. 1996); Elliott’s Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 
F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
91Rapco, Inc., 85 F.3d at 954-955. 
92E.g., Id.
93E.g., Dexsil Corp., 147 F.3d at 101. (“[I]n this circuit the independent investor test is not 
a separate autonomous factor; rather, it provides a lens through which the entire analysis 
should be viewed.”); Normandie Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. 1738 
(2000) (5 factors). 
94Exacto Spring Corp., 196 F.3d at 838. 
95Id. at 839.
96Id. at 838.
97Id.  As the court noted in Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner:
If the rate of return is extremely high, it will be difficult to prove that the manager is 
being overpaid, for it will be implausible that if he quit if his salary was cut, and he 
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Although the Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner holding with respect to an 
employee who is singularly responsible for the success of a company appears to 
diminish the subjectivity of the reasonableness determination by eliminating factor 
analysis, the need for other subjective judgments emerges.  For example, a 
reasonable rate of return on investment must be determined.98  The Exacto Spring 
Corp. v. Commissioner court dealt with the matter in a simplistic manner. It relied 
on an Internal Revenue Service expert who testified that 13 percent was reasonable.99
The issue apparently was not disputed because the actual return on investment, 20 
percent, was so far in excess of the 13 percent amount. 
C.  Other Subjective Determinations 
Another subjective determination that is required in both the multi-factor analysis 
and the independent investor test is the extent of the employee’s contribution to the 
profitability of the company. Under the multi-factor analysis, the impact of the 
employee’s efforts on profitability determines the “intent to compensate” prong of 
section 162. Under the independent investor test, the employee’s contribution to 
company profitability impacts the independent investor’s view of the effect of the 
employee’s services on the actual return on investment.  When the responsibility for 
a business’s success can be attributed to just one key person, such as Heitz, the 
                                                          
was replaced by a lower-paid manager, the owner would be better off; it would be 
killing the goose that lays the golden egg. 
Id.
98Dexsil Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1998) (“If the bulk of the 
corporation’s earnings and profits are being paid out in the form of compensation such that the 
corporate profits do not represent a reasonable return on the shareholder’s investment, then an 
independent investor would probably disapprove of the compensation arrangement.”).  Id.
The determination of a reasonable expected rate of return is analogous to the 
determination of a company’s fair market value.  A basic valuation principle lies in the fact 
that “the value of an ownership interest in a company is equal to is equal to the present worth 
of the future benefits of ownership.” Some valuation methods are directly structured around 
this principle, in that they are based upon discounting an earnings stream to a present value 
using a discount percentage and capitalization rate that takes into consideration the risks of the 
investment in determining an expected rate of return.  One method of determining a discount 
or capitalization rate is through a “build-up” method.  A build-up method is based on the 
notion that a discount rate is based on a combination of identifiable risk factors which 
determine the total return that a prudent investor would demand. In Revenue Ruling 59-60, 
which provides standards for valuing stock of closely held businesses, the Internal Revenue 
Service acknowledged how imprecise the determination of a capitalization rate is and the wide 
variations that can exist even between companies within the same industry. Many risk factors 
affect an expected rate of return; these include the size of the business, its diversification of 
operations, financial risk; such as leverage and coverage ratios and prevailing economic 
conditions, ease in marketability, restrictions on transfer, and various industry risk factors, 
such as diversification of operations, depth of management, and competition created by 
technological advances. Where a company’s actual return on investment is closer to the 
claimed reasonable expected rate of return, judgments regarding the company’s inherent risks 
again make the judgment of reasonableness subjective and unpredictable. JAY E. FISHMAN, ET 
AL, GUIDE TO BUSINESS VALUATIONS §§ 500.1-502.16 (11th ed. 2001); Rev. Rul. 59-60 § 6, 
1959-1 C.B. 237. 
99Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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“chief executive officer, chief manufacturing executive, chief research and 
development officer, and chief sales and marketing executive”100 in Exacto Spring 
Corp. v. Commissioner, application of the independent investor test is simplified.  It 
omits the allocation of contributed efforts to return on investment.  The responsibility 
for success may sometimes be attributed to several employees, however, each of 
whom played an integral role in the company’s overall success.  In holding that 
payments received under a contingent payment plan based on a pre-determined 
percentage of earnings were reasonable, the court in William S. Gray and Co. v. 
United States evaluated the efforts and abilities of the employees and their 
connection with the success of the company.101  The William S. Gray court accepted 
as reasonable an allocation of contingent payments among six key employees.102
An additional dimension of the determination with regard to the employee’s 
contribution to profitability is the extent to which external factors also had a 
significant impact.  Flourishing general economic conditions, for example, could be 
a boon to business that is not attributable to employee efforts.103  The facts and 
circumstances of each case must be examined to determine the extent to which an 
employee’s efforts are responsible for increased profitability, and are therefore 
deserving of compensation.104  The Sixth Circuit in Mayson Mfg. v. Commissioner
refused to attribute the taxpayer’s increased sales to the fortuitous war time economy 
that prevailed in 1943.  “[T]his alone does not establish unreasonableness where war 
business has resulted in increased work and responsibility.”105  In The Roth Office 
Equipment Co. v. Gallagher, the Sixth Circuit explained that the war economy 
generated competition for the increased business, which was only procured through 
the employees’ efforts.106  Even the Exacto Spring v. Commissioner court, while 
                                                                
100 Compare Exacto Spring Corp., 196 F.3d at 836 (noting that Heitz was not only 
Exacto’s CEO, but also it chief salesman, marketing man, head of research and development 
efforts and principal inventor, and that the company’s entire success was due to Heitz’s 
research and development and marketing of the company’s innovations), with Donald Palmer 
Co. Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1869 (1995) (holding that limits to compensation 
exist for most valuable employees where return on investment is negative). 
101William S. Gray & Co., Inc. v. United States, 35 F.2d 968, 975 (Ct. Cl. 1925). 
The men were worth to the business the compensation paid them.  They could not be 
retained without it and the business would have suffered had they severed their 
connection with it.  Their retention was necessary to its success, and the success was 
due to their efforts, and the arrangement as to percentages of profits had been made in 
good faith.  There is nothing in the record to even suggest that this was an effort to 
avoid taxation. 
Id.
102Id. at 970. 
103Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115,120 (6th Cir. 1949). 
104Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 839 (7th Cir. 1999).  
105Mayson Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d at 120 (citing Roth Office Equip. v. Gallagher, 172 F.2d 
452, 456 (6th Cir. 1949)). 
106Roth Office Equip., 172 F.2d at 456. 
The experience of the three officers, the contacts and good will established by years of 
work, hard work and long hours, plus the operation of the bonus plan enabled them to 
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establishing presumptive reasonableness for compensation paid to an employee who 
single-handedly generated a higher than expected return on investment, warned that 
the presumption is rebuttable due to the impact of external circumstances, such as 
new knowledge that the company’s factory is sitting on an oil field.107
The reasonableness determination of a salary payment can also be affected by the 
taxpayer’s contention that a payment adequately compensates the employee for past 
services. The Supreme Court held and the Internal Revenue Service acquiesced in 
the view that “a deduction for reasonable compensation is not limited to amounts 
paid as compensation for services rendered in current years.  Payments made by an 
employer to an employee may be deductible as reasonable compensation for current 
and past services rendered.”108  In this situation, the determination of reasonable 
compensation expands to all prior years for which the payment is claimed to be 
made, creating additional dimensions of subjectivity. 
The many levels of subjectivity in making a reasonable compensation 
determination–weighing factors, analyzing comparisons to employees of other 
companies, determining a reasonable expected rate of return for an independent 
investor, determining the portion of the company’s profitability attributable to the 
employee’s efforts, and determining whether a payment is reasonable for past 
services–make it a highly unpredictable judgment.109
IV. INTERPLAY OF THE HIGHLY SUBJECTIVE DETERMINATION OF REASONABLE 
AMOUNT WITH THE FORMULATION OF THE INTENTS TO GIFT AND TO COMPENSATE
A.  Intent to Compensate 
The taxpayer has sometimes been bound by an original characterization, 
indicating an intent to compensate.110  His deduction of the amount as compensation 
expense on his income tax return demonstrates the intent.111  The Court of Claims 
argued in Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States that  
[C]ompensation remains compensation even if it is held unreasonable in 
amount and, accordingly, not deductible as a business expense.  The 
                                                          
take advantage of the favorable situation and for a few years receive liberal 
compensation.  But it was still compensation for personal services, and of a kind that 
was entitled to liberal compensation when the results were sufficiently successful to 
pay it. 
Id.
107Exacto Spring Corp., 196 F.3d at 839.   
108R.J. Nicoll v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 37, 50 (1972), acq. 1973-1 C.B. 2 (citing Lucas v. 
Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115, 119 (1930)).  The Lucas court explained that the payments 
for past services were incurred in the year of payment because there were no prior agreements 
to pay or legal obligation to pay these amounts.  There was nothing in the tax law to preclude 
payment in a later year based on an internal policy decision to reward earlier efforts.  Lucas,
281 U.S. at 119 (1930). 
109Exacto Spring Corp., 196 F.3d at 835. 
110E.g., Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 552, 556 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
111Willke v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 953, 956 (6th Cir. 1942). 
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payment does not change in character solely because it is characterized as 
excessive or undue.  The non-deductibility of the expense by the payer, 
because it is unreasonable in amount, does not transform the payment in 
the hands of the payee.112
But later in the same opinion, the court states, in what appears to be a contrary 
stance, “If such payments are not true compensation they must, of course, be treated 
as what they actually are; presumably, that is what the Commissioner will insist on 
doing.”113  Notwithstanding this statement, the court held “that all the payments to 
Sterno Sales in 1951 must be treated as they have up to now been by all the parties, 
as compensation and therefore as includible in gross income under the wide reach of 
Section 22(a) of the 1939 Code.”114  The court’s concern in forbidding claims by the 
taxpayer that the payment should be recharacterized as other than compensation 
appears to be the potential tax benefit that could arise from the recharacterization.115
Examples might include the reduction of payroll tax liabilities, treatment of 
compensation as a non-taxable S corporation dividend, treatment of a payment to a 
family member as an excludable gift, or treatment as a contribution of capital to a 
related corporation, as was the case in Sterno Sales v. United States.  “[T]he 
Regulations do not suggest that payments which have hitherto been considered by 
everyone (including the Service) to be compensation, though in excess of reasonable 
compensation, can or may be treated as of another character by the recipient in order 
to gain a tax advantage for himself.” 116   This implies that the taxpayer could 
deliberately attempt to deduct excessive salary payments, hoping they would not be 
challenged, because this characterization renders the best tax result for the payment.  
If payments are challenged, he could change his characterization to, say, a dividend 
to the owner followed by a gift to the recipient.  This creates a better result than if the 
payment were compensation, with the excess portion treated as non-deductible. 
The inherent unfairness in applying this prohibition on a taxpayer’s substance 
over form argument in reasonable compensation cases stems from the extreme 
subjectivity of the reasonableness determination, which prevents the taxpayer from 
knowing in advance what portion of his payment the government will determine to 
be reasonable.  As the Exacto court noted, “because the reaction of the Tax Court to 
a challenge to the deduction of executive compensation is unpredictable, 
corporations run unavoidable legal risks in determining a level of compensation that 
may be indispensable to the success of their business.” 117   An employer’s 
determination of an appropriate amount of compensation could be based on his own 
good faith, subjective judgment of reasonableness.  Although all the relevant facts 
                                                                
112Sterno Sales Corp., 345 F.2d at 554. 
113 Id. at 556-57. (The dissent attacked the majority opinion for shirking its duty to 
determine the true character of the excessive compensation payments:  “I believe that it is up 
to this court to decide whether such excessive payments were, in effect, a distribution of 
earnings and profits.”).  Id.
114Id. at 556. 
115Id. at 554, 556.  
116Id. at 556. 
117Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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were available to him at the time of the payment, the government’s subjective 
analysis was not.  Thus, the subjectivity removes the assumption of deliberate abuse 
that the court’s opinion is apparently intended to curb.  Therefore, the originally 
indicated intent to compensate should be subject to re-evaluation.  At the time the 
intent to compensate was indicated, the taxpayer could not reasonably be expected to 
foresee the government’s subsequent determination that a reasonable person would 
not have paid that amount as salary.  In an equally subjective context, however, the 
courts have consistently acknowledged the right of the taxpayer to argue substance 
over form to assert a step transaction theory.118
[W]ithout regard to whether the result is imposition or relief from 
taxation, the courts have recognized that where the essential nature of a 
transaction is the acquisition of property, it will be viewed as a whole, and 
closely related steps will not be separated either at the instance of the 
taxpayer or the taxing authority.119
The government’s determination that compensation while unreasonable is in fact 
compensation is essentially a poor act of recharacterization, because it does not 
follow the facts as presented.  A substance over form argument by the taxpayer is an 
equitable response proposing recharacterization of the government’s newly asserted 
position.  Where the taxpayer’s compensation deduction was intentionally abusive, 
and the specific circumstances indicate that there is truly no better characterization 
for the payments than excessive compensation, the taxpayer’s substance over form 
argument will likely fail on its merits.  
“Reasonable” is defined as what is “[f]air, proper, just, moderate, suitable under 
the circumstances.”120  Unreasonable compensation, then, is that which exceeds the 
value of the services rendered.  “[R]easonable and true compensation is only such 
amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like 
circumstances.”121  The definition of “compensation” in all of its various contexts 
centers around the notion of equivalency.   
[M]aking whole . . . giving an equivalent or substitute of equal value.  
That which is necessary to restore an injured party to his former     
position . . . .  Equivalent in money for a loss sustained; equivalent given 
for property taken or for an injury done to another; giving back an 
equivalent in either money which is but the measure of value, or in actual 
value otherwise conferred.”122
When payment is determined unreasonable, the requisite equivalency between 
payment and services is lacking.  The payment fails to compensate, by definition, 
                                                                
118Robert Thornton Smith, Substance and Form:  A Taxpayer’s Right to Assert the Priority 
of Substance, 44 TAX LAW. 137, 151 (1990).  “[S]tep transaction doctrine . . . seeks to treat a 
series of formally separate steps as a single transaction.”  Id. at 150-151. 
119Id. (citing Commissioner v. Ashland Oil and Refining Co., 99 F.2d 558, 591 (6th Cir. 
1938)).
120BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 874 (6th ed. 1991). 
121Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (1960). 
122BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 194 (6th ed. 1991). 
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notwithstanding an intent to compensate.  Therefore, it must be recharacterized as 
other than compensation. 
B.  Intent to Gift 
In cases where the taxpayer has argued that the disallowed unreasonable portion 
of a compensation payment is a gift, the courts have discredited the claim based on 
the notion that an element of a gift is lacking, i.e., the intent of the donor to make a 
gift.123  An example of such a case is Smith v. Manning.124  Because the taxpayer in 
this case held out that payments to his daughters were salaries by 1) stating that they 
were compensation at the time the payments were made, 2) by deducting them as 
salaries on his income tax return, and 3) by maintaining that view to the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Tax Court, the court held that the payments were made 
“without a donative intent.”125 Willke v. Commissioner simplified the parameters of 
the gift verses compensation distinction, holding that the taxpayer’s deduction for 
compensation negates the intent to make a gift.126  In both of these cases, because the 
original transaction displayed an intent to compensate, there was no 
recharacterization.  The court treated the unreasonable payment as a disallowed 
compensation expense and the income as compensation income to the original 
recipient.
In each case, the original statement of intent occurred prior to the government’s 
determination of reasonableness.  Given the subjectivity of that judgment, the 
taxpayer should have had an opportunity to reconsider an intent as if the 
determination were available at the time of the payment.  Had the taxpayer known 
the prescribed limits on reasonable compensation, he might have made the payment 
gratuitously, based on impulses of affection, respect, charity, or the like that are 
intrinsic to a gift.127  Furthermore, the payment of the unreasonable portion would be 
made with the requisite lack of consideration of a gift128 because it was determined 
that there was no exchange for value of services.  
                                                                
123Id. at 473.  Black’s defines a gift as: 
A voluntary transfer of property to another made gratuitously and without 
consideration.  Essential requisites of gift are capacity of donor, intention of donor to 
make gift, completed delivery to or for the donee, and acceptance of gift by donee.  In 
tax law, a payment is a gift if it is made without conditions, from detached and 
disinterested generosity, out of affection, respect, charity, or like impulses, and not 
from the constraining force of any moral or legal duty or from the incentive of 
anticipated benefits of an economic nature. 
Id.
124189 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1951). 
125Id.
126 Willke v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 953, 956 (6th Cir. 1942). (“The fact that the 
corporate payor claimed the present payment as a deduction at arriving at its taxable net 
income for the year in question is regarded as an intent to pay compensation for services rather 
than to make a gift.”).  Id.
127BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 473 (6th ed. 1991). 
128Id.
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The failure to recharacterize in Smith v. Manning and Willke v. Commissioner is 
consistent with the Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States court’s holding that 
considered the Court of Claims bound by the characterization of the parties.129  Judge 
Davis, writing for the majority, looked no further than the original transaction to 
support or discredit that characterization.130
The courts have reclassified compensation as a payment out of generosity 
following a constructive dividend payment to the owner.  In Montgomery Eng’g Co.  
v. United States, the Third Circuit recharacterized salary payments to an officer’s 
widow as a dividend to the surviving stockholder because the payment was made due 
to a moral obligation, rather than for a business purpose.131  The circuit court negated 
the taxpayer’s displayed intent to compensate, finding that the facts and 
circumstances defined a different characterization.132  This determination achieved a 
much higher degree of equity than the Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States holding.  
Recharacterization caused the associated tax liabilities to be borne by the appropriate 
parties in accordance with the true nature of the transaction.  
V. DETERMINATION OF CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS
A.  Non-Restricted Determination 
The distinction between a payment made with respect to the corporation’s stock 
and a payment made for services is not clear.  This determination is made on a case 
by case basis, based on each case’s own particular circumstances.133 A payment can 
be a constructive dividend, even if it is not formally declared,134  not paid to a  
                                                                
129Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 552, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
130Id. at 557. 
131Montgomery Eng’g Co. v. United States, 344 F.2d 996, 997 (3d Cir. 1965). 
132Id. See also Garrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 281, 285 (1969) 
[E]xcessive compensation compensation does not, as a matter of law, retain that 
characterization for tax purposes in the hands of the recipient.  Nor must it necessarily 
be considered something other than compensation.  Neither the label initially affixed 
by the taxpayer nor the failure of the respondent to provide an alternative for the 
disallowed payment is conclusive.  The touchstone for decision is a factual 
determination as to the actual nature of the payment in question under all the 
circumstances, free from any compulsory inhibitions stemming from the designations 
of the parties. 
Id.
133Garrison, 52 T.C. at 285. (“Whether or not a corporate distribution is a dividend or 
something else, such as a gift, compensation for services, repayment of a loan, interest on a 
loan, or payment for property purchased, presents a question of fact to be determined in each 
case.”). 
134Kennington Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 1030, 1035 (1927). (The Kennington
Realty Co. v. Commissioner court held that payments that were not made as a result of 
corporate action declaring a dividend were in fact dividends. It noted a presumption of 
corporate authorization where distributions were computed and paid by an officer of a close 
corporation that was controlled by one man.).  Id.
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shareholder,135 not pro rata to stock ownership,136 or not a distribution under state 
law.137  “The hallmark of a constructive distribution is value passing from, or a 
sufficiently specific economic benefit conferred by, the corporation to the 
shareholder, for which the shareholder does not give equivalent value in 
exchange.”138
While payments of dividends need not be pro rata, proportionality of payments to 
stockholdings can, nonetheless, be indicative of a distribution. Treasury Regulation 
section 1.162-7(b)(1) suggests dividend potential where payments “are in excess of 
those ordinarily paid for similar services, and the excessive payments correspond or 
bear a close relationship to the stockholdings of the officers or employees.”139
B.  Failure to Pay Dividends 
A corporation’s failure to pay dividends can further implicate compensation 
payments as disguised dividends.  Rev. Rul. 79-8 repudiated the former automatic 
dividend rule, under which dividends are necessarily implied from the failure of the 
corporation to pay more than insubstantial dividends,140  in support of decisions 
subsequent to Charles McCandless Tile Ser. Co. v. United States.141  Nonetheless, 
                                                                
135Montgomery Eng’g Co. v. United States, 344 F.2d at 996 (3d Cir. 1965). 
136E.g., Id.; Garrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 281, 286 (1969) (noting that “in the 
context of dealings between members of a family and their closely held corporation, the non-
prorata character of a payment to the shareholders does not, standing alone, preclude 
characterization of the payment as a dividend.”); Kennington Realty Co., 8 B.T.A. at 1035.  In 
holding that payments were distributions with respect to stock rather than compensation, the 
court found that the fact that one shareholder received no dividends was immaterial, “since by 
unanimous agreement of the stockholders, corporations may distribute earnings to 
stockholders other than ratably on the basis of stock holdings.”  Id.
137Jaques v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 104, 108 (6th Cir. 1991). 
138BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FED. INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 8.05[1] (7th ed. 2000). 
139Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1) (1960). The O.S.C. & Assoc’s, Inc. v. Commissioner court 
recast admittedly reasonable compensation as a dividend, based on lack of compensatory 
intent. It used the proportionality of payments, as well as the failure of the corporation to pay 
any dividends, as indicia of disguised dividend payments. Once these indicia were established, 
the court reasoned that an inquiry into the existence of compensatory intent was justified.  
O.S.C. & Assoc’s Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3231 (1997), aff’d 187 F.3d 1116 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
140Charles McCandless Tile Serv. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970) 
(holding that where purported compensation was reasonable but dividend history was poor, 
compensation necessarily included distribution of earnings). 
141Rev. Rul 79-8, 1979-1 C.B. 92.  According to the ruling: 
The failure of a closely held corporation to pay more than an insubstantial portion of 
its earnings as dividends on its stock is a very significant factor to be taken into 
account in determining the deductibility of compensation paid by the corporation to its 
shareholder-employees.  Conversely, where after an examination of all the facts and 
circumstances (including the corporation’s dividend history) compensation paid to the 
shareholder-employees is found to be reasonable in amount and paid for services 
rendered, deductions for such compensation under section 162(a) of the Code will not 
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courts consistently treat the failure to pay dividends as a significant factor in 
determining whether questionable payments are reasonable compensation or 
constructive distributions.142
As a defense against the implication that a company’s failure to pay dividends 
renders compensation payments to be disguised dividends, the taxpayer can avail 
himself of those same defenses of reasonable anticipated needs of the business as are 
used to negate the imposition of the accumulated earnings tax143 imposed under 
Internal Revenue Code section 531.144 Reasonably anticipated needs of the business 
must be “specific, definite, and feasible plans for the use of such accumulation.”145
These needs can include such items as adequate working capital and liquidity 
needs,146 growth and capital improvement plans,147 anticipated stock redemption,148
or contingent liabilities, such as product liability loss reserves. 149   Thus, when 
evaluating the reasonableness of compensation, just as when evaluating the 
applicability of a “penalty” tax for not paying dividends, a corporation can defend its 
failure to pay dividends, and accordingly, its characterization as compensation.150
In reviewing the corporation’s dividend payment history to do an “independent 
investor” analysis of reasonableness, the return on investment, which must be at a 
market rate of return after the salary payment in question, includes not only dividend 
                                                          
be denied on the sole ground that the corporation has not paid more than an 
insubstantial portion of its earnings as dividends on its outstanding stock. 
Id.  See also Edwin’s Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1974) (“[W]hile the 
absence of dividends might be a red flag, it should not deprive compensation demonstrated to 
be reasonable under all of the circumstances of the status of reasonableness.”).  
142Kennedy v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d 167, 176 (6th Cir. 1982) (“It is true that non-
payment of dividends by a close corporation is a factor which may indicate that compensation 
is unreasonable . . . however that alone is not determinative.”); O.S.C. & Assoc’s, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3231 (1997). 
143I.R.C. § 531 (West 2001).  This is a tax imposed on corporations that have failed to 
distribute the corporation’s earnings and profits in order to avoid shareholder income tax on 
dividends.  Despite a presumption of avoidance, the tax is not imposed where the corporation 
can prove by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary that the accumulation does not 
exceed the “reasonable needs of the business.” I.R.C § 533(a) (West 2001). 
144KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-4. 
145Treas. Reg. § 1.537(1)(b) (1986). 
146E.g., New England Wooden Ware v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 111, 117 (D. Mass. 
1968).
147Id.
148Treas. Reg. § 1.537(1)(a) (1986). 
149Id.
150E.g., Levenson & Klein, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 694, 714 (1977) (holding that 
where cash received on trade accounts receivable was restricted as security for bank notes, 
leaving only enough unrestricted cash to pay accounts payable and normal business expenses 
including salaries, the failure to pay dividends did not impact the determination of 
reasonableness).  
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payments, but also unrealized appreciation in the value of the stock.151  Thus, the 
payment of only small dividends or the failure to pay dividends does not in itself 
equate to an inadequate return on investment.152
The finding of a constructive dividend, i.e., where “the corporation conferred an 
economic benefit on the stockholder without expectation of repayment,”153 is not 
determined by the motive or expressed intent of the corporation.154  In fact, it may be 
contrary to the corporation’s expressed intent.155  The fact that an intent to pay a 
dividend is not required, coupled with the fact that case law places great flexibility in 
the determination of dividends, combine to make an easy threshold for a finding of a 
constructive dividend.  The reclassification of excess compensation as a distribution 
of earnings is mandated where the facts and circumstances indicate that it is a 
distribution with respect to the stock, i.e., a constructive dividend. 156   Where 
compensation payments are unreasonable, an economic benefit was conferred on the 
shareholder; no expectation of repayment in value (i.e., value as determined by the 
government) of services are expected.  Therefore, the payment is a constructive 
dividend, by definition, and should be recharacterized as such.  
VI. COMPARISON OF SECTION 162 DEDUCTION LIMITATION TO POLICY-BASED 
SALARY DEDUCTION LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO LARGE, PUBLICLY 
TRADED COMPANIES
A.  Golden Parachute Payments 
One policy-based limitation on the deductibility of compensation concerns 
golden parachute payments.157  A golden parachute is a type of employment contract 
between a corporation and an executive providing substantial severance pay in the 
event of a change in corporate control.158  “[T]he parachute does not open until the 
                                                                
151Home Interiors and Gifts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1142, 1162 (1977) (“[W]hen 
the return to shareholders in the form of dividends and appreciation in the value of their stock 
was examined, it is apparent that the exceptional prosperity of the company was shared with 
the stockholders.”).  See also Elliott’s Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 
1983); Trucks, Inc. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 638, 647 (D. Neb. 1984). 
152 Home Interiors and Gifts, Inc, 73 T.C. at 1148 (holding that compensation was 
reasonable where the ratio of dividends to net profit declined in years of tremendous growth in 
sales and profits). 
153United States v. Smith, 418 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1959).  The term repayment is 
reworded in the Bittker definition of constructive dividend as “equivalent value in exchange.” 
BITTKER ET AL, supra note 139, at ¶ 8.05[1]. 
154Smith, 418 F.2d at 593. 
155Id.
156BITTKER ET AL, supra note 139, at ¶ 8.05[1]. 
157KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-18.  “The Finance Committee emphasized that it was 
unwilling to have the tax law used as a ‘subsidy,’ and expressed its intent that such contracts 
warranted adverse tax consequences.”  Id. (citing S. Prt. 169, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 195 (1984)). 
158KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-17. 
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company experiences some control-altering event.”159  It can be argued that these 
contracts can secure some beneficial results, such as the ability to procure and retain 
high level management personnel who will maintain objectivity and independence.160
Critics of golden parachute contracts, however, attack them generally on the basis 
that they unjustifiably subsidize the current management team at the expense of 
shareholders.161  Critics argue that the corporation will likely not receive an adequate 
return on its investment,162 and that such payments waste corporate assets by unduly 
compensating executives who are already well paid.163  Furthermore, payments are 
often made to dismissed executives or those who resigned, raising the question of 
how the payments could be related to the employee’s worth and value to the future of 
the business.164  Additionally, the proposed benefits of objectivity and independence 
of the golden parachute payments are no more than what was originally required by 
the employee’s fiduciary duty to the publicly traded company. 165   Rather than 
insuring objectivity and independence in management, the payments could actually 
be functioning to breed complacence. 166   The result of all these concerns is a 
dichotomy of the interests of management employees and shareholders. 
To protect the conflicting interests of shareholders, who bear the cost of golden 
parachute agreements through either a reduction in return on investment or a reduced 
tender offer price due to the assumed parachute payment obligation by the acquiring 
company, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code sections 280G and 4999. 167
These provisions impose penalty taxes on “excess parachute payments”168 made only 
by large corporations with readily tradable stock.169  Section 280G renders those 
payments that are calculated to be excess parachute payments non-deductible,170
while section 4999 imposes a 20 percent excise tax on such payments to the 
recipient. 171   The full amount of the payments remains salary income to the 
                                                                
159Henry F. Johnson, Those “Golden Parachute” Agreements: The Taxman Cuts the 
Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 45 (1985) (citing Lynn A. Grisham & Doug Rake, Comment, 
Future Executive Bail Outs:  Will Golden Parachutes Fill the American Business Skies?, 14 
TEX TECH. L. REV. 615, 616 (1983)). 
160Id. at 48-49. 
161KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-18. 
162Johnson, supra note 160, at 51 (citing William R. Spalding, Note, Golden Parachutes: 
Executive Employment Contracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1983)). 
163Id. (citing W. PAINTER, BUSINESS PLANNING 748 (2d ed. 1984)). 
164Id. at 51-52. 
165Id. at 52-53. 
166Id. at 54. 
167I.R.C. §§ 2806, 4999 (West 2001). 
168I.R.C. § 280G(b) (West 2001). 
169I.R.C. § 280G(b)(6). (West 2001). 
170I.R.C. § 280G(a) (West 2001). 
171I.R.C. § 4999(a) (West 2001). 
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recipient.172  Any compensation payments that are reasonable under section 162 and 
related to services before the change of corporate control, however, are excluded 
from treatment as excess parachute payments under sections 280G and 4999.173
B.  Limited Executive Compensation Deduction 
A second limitation on the deductibility of compensation paid to key executives 
of publicly held companies is the $1,000,000 maximum annual deduction limit per 
covered individual contained in Internal Revenue Code section 162(m). 174  A 
“covered individual” is either the chief executive officer of the company175 or a non-
chief executive officer for whom reporting is required under the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, usually as a result of being one of the four highest paid, non-
CEO officers.176  Commissions and performance-based compensation, however, are 
not subject to the $1,000,000 limit.177
Each of these two provisions, the golden parachute disallowance and the excess 
over $1,000,000 disallowance, maintains an interplay with the reasonableness 
requirement of section 162(a). 178   An excess parachute payment is reduced by 
reasonable compensation. 179   Therefore, only unreasonable compensation is 
disallowed under section 280G and penalized under section 4999.180  Under section 
162(m), however, the excess compensation over $1,000,000 is disallowed under a 
statutory determination of per se unreasonableness.  But the provisions of section 
162(m)(4)(B) and (C), which exclude commissions and performance-based 
compensation from disallowance,181 serve to maintain the deductibility of payments 
that are actually compensation for services.  It is only for public policy reasons that 
these statutory provisions arose,182 seemingly to curb abuses in corporate activity that 
                                                                
172I.R.C. § 61 (West 2001). 
173I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4)(B) (West 2001) (“[T]he amount treated as an excess parachute 
payment shall be reduced by the portion of such payment which the taxpayer establishes by 
clear and convincing evidence is reasonable compensation for personal services actually 
rendered before the date of the change described in paragraph (2)(A)(i).”). 
174I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2001). 
175I R.C. § 162(m)(3)(A) (West 2001). 
176I.R.C. § 162(m)(3)(B) (West 2001). 
177I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(B)-(C) (West 2001). 
178I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 2001). 
179I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4)(B) (West 2001). 
180I.R.C. §§ 280G(b)(4), 4999(b) (West 2001). 
181I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(B)-(C) (West, 2001) (subparagraph (B) referring to income paid on 
a commission basis; subparagraph (C) referring to performance-based compensation). 
182The RIA COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993, 705 
(Research Administration of America 1993). 
Recently, the amount of compensation received by corporate executives has been the 
subject of scrutiny and criticism.  The [Senate Finance] committee believes that 
excessive compensation will be reduced if the deduction for compensation (other than 
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were perceived by the legislature to have a detrimental effect on the shareholders of 
the companies, as well as on the general public.183  In the spirit of section 162(a), 
these provisions provide bright line calculations of presumptively unreasonable 
compensation and render it non-deductible. 
The characterization of non-deductible compensation as compensation income to 
the payee is appropriate in the large, publicly-traded corporation context.  Here, the 
only feasible character of the payment is compensation, because the employer-
employee relationship is the only basis for payment.  Even if the managers are also 
shareholders, dividends are always formally declared in the publicly-traded setting 
and paid pro-rata based on stock ownership.  “Constructive dividends generally are a 
problem limited to closely-held corporations.” 184   There is less opportunity for 
controlling owners to manipulate the characterization of payments or to divert them 
to family members for tax avoidance.185  Furthermore, the large corporation is on 
notice through the provisions of Internal Revenue Code sections 280G and 162(m) as 
to how to determine the potentially non-deductible amounts.  Except for the 
reduction to excess parachute payments for reasonable compensation, these 
provisions do not require a highly subjective judgment of value by the government.  
They are straight-forward mathematical calculations.186  Thus, the displayed intent of 
treating these payments as compensation should be binding because the payments 
arose exclusively out of the employer-employee relationship, and their classification 
was made when the potential non-deductible amount could be pre-determined. 
The publicly traded setting is clearly distinguishable from the closely held 
setting, because it virtually lacks the opportunity to make a distribution with respect 
to the ownership of stock and disguise it as compensation. Furthermore, limitations 
on compensation payments are driven by different public policy issues. Therefore, 
recharacterization is not required, as it would be in the closely held setting, to reflect 
the true nature of the payment.  As a matter of fact, it is not even possible.  There is 
simply no appropriate alternative treatment. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Once either the Internal Revenue Service or the courts determine that 
compensation payments made by a closely held business are unreasonable under 
section 162, the true, non-compensatory character of the payment must be 
ascertained.  Equity requires that the tax returns of all parties be adjusted 
accordingly.  Such a mandate serves not only to carry out the purpose of section 162, 
but also to prevent inconsistent results. 
                                                          
performance-based compensation) paid to the top executives of publicly held 
corporations is limited to $1 million per year. 
Id.
183See generally Johnson, supra note 160, at 68. 
184BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  331 (6th ed. 1991). 
185Kropf, Inc. v. United States, 543 F. Supp. 581, 583 (D. Colo. 1982) (“Payments made 
by closely held corporations to officer-stockholders will be given special scrutiny in order to 
determine whether the payment constitutes compensation for services or a distribution of 
profits.”). 
186I.R.C. § 280G(b) (West 2001) (explaining “excess parachute payment” calculation); 
I.R.C. 162(m)(1)(West 2001) (explaining “excessive employee remuneration”). 
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A.  Inconsistencies of Failure to Recharacterize 
The unwillingness of the courts, in some cases, to recast the transaction to its true 
form has provided numerous inconsistencies.  It has created inconsistent results 
between cases of comparable circumstances. 187   Further, it has provided results 
inconsistent with the purpose of unveiling disguises.188  First, it is inconsistent with 
the language of Treasury Regulation section 1.162-8, which states conditions under 
which recharacterization is required.189  Second, the continued characterization of 
unreasonable compensation as compensation is inconsistent with the finding that no 
reasonable person could have paid this amount as compensation.  Finally, 
“compensation,” by definition, connotes equivalency.190   Unreasonable payments 
lack equivalency to the value of the services performed and, therefore, are 
inconsistent with the definition of compensation. 
Judge Posner, in his concurring opinion in Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero 
Corp., commented on the importance of consistency of the law.  He noted that “[t]he 
most important function of appellate review is to maintain consistency of the law; if 
consistency is not a desideratum, the argument for appellate review is weakened.”191
B.  Unveiling Disguised Payments 
The intent of the reasonableness restriction of section 162, i.e., to prevent 
payments of a non-compensatory character from being disguised as compensation in 
order to create a tax benefit, is demonstrated both through statutory language and 
through the history of cases in which a section 162 challenge has been raised by the 
government.  Treasury regulations illustrate the heightened scrutiny required for 
related party transactions192 as well as defend compensation payments made under 
good-faith negotiations.193   Both Treasury Regulations and the Internal Revenue 
Code address ostensible salary payments that are actually of a different character, 
requiring that they be treated as what they truly are.194
Virtually all reasonable compensation challenges under section 162(a) have 
occurred in the context of payments by closely held businesses to related parties, that 
is, parties related either through ownership of the paying company or through a 
                                                                
187E.g., compare  Montgomery Eng’g Co. v. United States, 344 F.2d 996, 997 (3d Cir. 
1965), with  Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 552, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
188Sterno Sales Corp., 345 F.2d at 554 . 
189Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1960) (requiring recharacterization of payments in proportion to 
stockholdings found to be a dividend and of payments for property). 
190BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 473 (6th ed. 1991). 
191Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, 741 F.2d 925, 937 (7th Cir. 1984).  See also Vesco v. 
Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 101 (1979) (“We merely hold that respondent’s practice 
[Commissioner of Internal Revenue] in effect in 1971 should be applied to petitioner on same 
basis as it is applied to other taxpayers.”). 
192Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a) (1960). 
193Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b) (1960). 
194I.R.C. § 911(b) (West 2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1960). 
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family relationship with an owner.195  It is here that the most blatant opportunities for 
intentional maneuvering for the taxpayer’s benefit exist.  The level of scrutiny has 
consistently dissipated as the strength of the relationship becomes more attenuated.196
Challenges under section 162(a) to payments in the large, publicly traded sector, 
which are less susceptible to individual manipulation, have been avoided.  Because 
the public policy concerns surrounding large compensation payments are the primary 
issue here, as opposed to recharacterization as something other than compensation, 
sections 280G and 162(m) have been relied upon instead to curb excessive 
compensation payments.197
The failure to challenge S corporation compensation, where distributions most 
commonly provide tax-free income, 198  supports an intent of unveiling disguised 
payments from which a tax benefit has been inappropriately derived.  In general, an 
S corporation shareholder has no incentive to pay himself excessive salary.  His 
salary deduction is offset by corresponding income and payroll taxes.  Only special S 
corporation situations in which an undeserved tax benefit might have been achieved, 
such as application of the maximum tax on earned income199 or the diversion of 
income to a family member with a lower marginal rate,200 have been targets of 
examination.201
Thus, the free rein of Treasury Regulation section 1.162-7 to disallow 
compensation deemed unreasonable in amount, even if fully intended to 
compensate,202 has only been exercised in cases of perceived potential massive abuse 
accompanying tax benefit.203 An example is where the owner of a closely held C 
corporation pays excessive salary for the purpose of avoiding the double level of 
taxation that generally results from dividend payments, which are non-deductible by 
the corporation.  From this, it could be argued that it is not the intention of section 
162 to impose a burden on free enterprise by creating governmentally imposed 
business judgments.  The intention is, rather, to restate disguised transactions in their 
true character. 
                                                                
195KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-5. 
196E.g. Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d at 833 (7th Cir. 1999); Harolds 
Club v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d at 865 (9th Cir. 1965). 
197Id.
198I.R.C. § 1368(b)(1); I.R.C. § 1368(c)(1) (explaining tax free distribution to extent of 
AAA). 
199I.R.C. § 1348-R (West 2001) (limiting tax rate on earned income (repealed by P.L. 97-
34 § 101(c)(1) for tax years beginning after December 31, 1981)). 
200I.R.C. § 1366(e) (West 2001) (allocating income among family members). 
201Trucks v. United States 588 F. Supp. at 638 (D. Neb. 1984) (exemplifying both S 
corporation issues).  See generally KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-36.
202 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a) (1960) (requiring that payments be both reasonable and 
intended to compensate in order to be deductible). 
203KAFKA, supra note 19, at A-5. 
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The courts generally assumed this equitable responsibility.  In most cases, they 
have recast transactions as they have perceived them.204  The cases that pronounced 
immutable characterizations inherent in the taxpayer’s compensation deductions 
have generally been involved in compensation versus gift determinations. With an 
additional burden of proving requisite donative intent in order to recharacterize as a 
gift, the courts have assumed donative intent incompatible with a compensation 
deduction.  Therefore, courts hold that excessive payments retain their original 
character as compensation, both to the payer and the recipient.205
In eliminating the possibility of recharacterization, however, these gift cases deny 
the opportunity to re-evaluate and restate the original intent after the subsequent 
determination of reasonableness is made. Furthermore, the courts fail to entertain the 
possibility of determining an original intent contrary to the one presented on the tax 
return. Nor do they entertain treatment as a constructive dividend to the shareholder, 
which requires no specific intent. A different view was taken, however, in 
Montgomery Eng’g v. United States, where the Third Circuit recharacterized 
ostensible compensation as a constructive dividend to the shareholder followed by a 
payment out of moral obligation and generosity to the recipient.206
In a non-gift case, Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States, the Court refused to 
consider recharacterizion of unreasonable compensation as a dividend, contrary to 
language in the case averring that a payment should be treated as what it truly is.207
Despite a result inconsistent with its own mandates, Sterno Sales Corp v. United 
States has not been overruled. 
Those cases in which the true character of the transaction has been considered 
and restated provide a more equitable result to the parties by allowing innocent 
differences in judgment as to the reasonable amount to be corrected and by restating 
tax liabilities as they would have been if the true nature of the transaction had been 
originally portrayed. 
C.  Evidence of Restated Intent 
The failure to recharacterize unreasonable compensation payments to their true 
nature prevents the tax consequences of the transaction from falling consistently with 
its economic substance.  A correct recharacterization of an unreasonable 
                                                                
204E.g., Montgomery Eng’g Co. v. United States, 344 F.2d 996, 997 (3d Cir. 1965) 
(reclassifying as a gift); Thomas v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 378, 379 (5th Cir. 1943) 
(reclassifying gift as compensation); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d 167, 176 (6th Cir. 
1982) (reclassifying as a dividend); Garrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 281, 285 (1969) 
(reclassifying as a liquidating dividend); Quarrier Diner, Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 276 (1963) (reclassifying as dividend to shareholder, not recipient); Kennington Realty 
Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 1030 (1927) (reclassifying as a dividend). 
205E.g., Smith v. Manning, 189 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1951); Willke v. Commissioner, 
127 F.2d 953, 956 (6th Cir. 1942); Walker v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1937); 
Fisher v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1932). 
206Montgomery Eng’g Co., 344 F.2d at 997. 
207Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 552, 556 (Ct. Cl 1965) (“If a payment 
originally labeled compensation is determined to be a dividend, the taxpayer (or other affected 
taxpayer) may well be able to get whatever benefits may lie in that re-evaluation.  They can 
take the Government or the Court at its word.”). 
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compensation payment requires the taxpayer’s ability to introduce evidence 
regarding his intent, with the ability to re-evaluate it in light of the government’s 
highly subjective determination of reasonableness.  In certain situations, he should be 
able to determine if he would have paid the excess amount anyway as a gift 
following a constructive ownership distribution.208  As an example, the Third Circuit 
supported this re-examination of intent when it determined that payments 
characterized as compensation were actually made out of moral obligation and 
generosity, and were thus a constructive dividend to the owner. 209   Treasury 
Regulation section section 1.162-8, which mandates recharacterization in certain 
situations, states that “[i]n the absence of evidence to justify other treatment, 
excessive payments for salaries or other compensation for personal services will be 
included in the gross income of the recipient.”210  Thus, the regulation implies the 
right of the taxpayer to introduce evidence regarding the substance of the transaction.  
The Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States court argued that the taxpayer is not 
permitted to assert a substance over form argument to recharacterize his transactions, 
because to do so would permit him to pay a tax resulting from his chosen form or 
any other form, whichever is less.211  It implies a prohibition on bad faith changes of 
position in order to gain a tax advantage.  The element that the court is missing, 
however, is the subjectivity of the reasonableness determination that makes it an 
unpredictable judgment when the transaction is originally characterized. 212
Therefore, what the court is challenging under the guise of bad faith can quite easily 
be merely a legitimate difference in judgment.  The court states that the government 
should determine the true nature of the transaction and cast it accordingly. 213
However, if it fails to do so, as it did in this case,214 the taxpayer has no recourse in 
raising his own argument of substance over form.215  If, on the other hand, the 
original transaction had been characterized in bad faith by the taxpayer for tax 
avoidance, it is unlikely that the taxpayer’s evidence would be sufficient to recast the 
transaction in contradiction to its true substance. 
                                                                
208E.g., Id.; Contra, e.g., Smith v. Manning, 189 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1951). 
209Montgomery Eng’g Co., 344 F.2d at 997. 
210Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1960). 
211Sterno Sales Corp, 345 F.2d at 554 (citing Television Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 
F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1960)). 
212Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999). 
213Sterno Sales Corp, 345 F.2d at 554. 
214Id. at 557 (Laramore, J.,dissenting).  
The Tax Court did not have to and, in fact did not determine the character of the 
excessive portion of the payments in the hands of the recipient . . . .  I believe that it 
was up to this court to decide whether such excessive payments were, in effect, a 
distribution of earnings and profits . . . . 
Id.
215Id. at 556 (“But where, as here, it is the taxpayer alone who seeks to impugn his own 
transaction for his own tax benefit, the courts will not pay heed.”). 
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D.  Constructive Dividend Treatment 
A recharacterization of unreasonable compensation as a constructive dividend is 
likely when “the corporation conferred an economic benefit on the stockholder 
without expectation of repayment.”216  There is no requirement of an intent to pay a 
dividend.217  As a matter of fact, the payment of a dividend can be contrary to the 
corporation’s expressed intent.218  Courts have consistently held that a dividend can 
be construed in the closely held setting despite lack of formality in declaration and 
despite lack of pro rata payment based on stockholdings.219  Therefore, the payment 
of unreasonable compensation in the corporate setting often defaults to the payment 
of a constructive dividend.220
E.  Unjust Enrichment 
The failure to restate unreasonable compensation in its true character provides an 
opportunity for unjust enrichment by the government and by the constructive (but 
not actual) recipient of the unreasonable compensation by maintaining tax treatments 
that do not reflect the economic reality of the transaction.  The gamut of taxes that 
could be affected by a recharacterization include income taxes,221 payroll taxes,222
and gift transfer taxes. 223   The net tax burden without recharacterization could 
increase for the taxpayer making the payment when compared to a recharacterized 
counterpart.  For example, payroll tax liabilities remain attached to the unreasonable 
portion.  The recipient’s liability, on the other hand, could be reduced through 
recharacterization if the income were truly non-taxable.  For example, a gift from a 
constructive recipient, or a non-taxable distribution from an S corporation.  In 
addition to these income tax savings, employee payroll tax liabilities would decrease 
on the portion of the payment that is recharacterized as other than compensation. 
Recharacterization could also shift the tax burden from the actual recipient to a 
constructive recipient, potentially increasing both his income tax and his gift tax 
liabilities.   
The taxes received by the government are likely to be higher when it fails to 
recharacterize.  It collects employer and employee payroll taxes on the full amount, 
and the income portion always retains its fully taxable character.  An exception 
                                                                
216United States v. Smith, 418 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1959). 
217Id.
218Id.
219Kennington Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 1030, 1035 (1927). 
220Kennedy v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 793, 806 (1979) (“Since petitioners have failed to 
prove that the excessive payments were part of a reasonable compensation allowance, and 
since no other reason for the payments exists, we must view the excess received as a 
distribution of earnings and profits.”). 
221I.R.C. § 61 (West 2001) (imposing tax generally on gross income); I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) 
(West 2001) (including reasonable salaries as ordinary and necessary business expenses). 
222 I.R.C. § 3121(a)-(b) (West 2001) (defining wages and employment for FICA and 
Medicare tax purposes). 
223I.R.C. § 2501 (West 2001) (imposing gift tax). 
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would be where an additional gift tax liability resulting from recharacterization, 
combined with the income and payroll tax liabilities, exceed the combined income 
tax and payroll tax liabilities of the transaction without recharacterization.  
Regardless of whose tax liability is benefited and whose is burdened in the 
recharacterization, and regardless of whether the U.S. Treasury is enriched or 
diminished, equity demands that the tax liabilities should fall based on the true 
substance of the transaction. 
BARBARA F. SIKON224
                                                                
224The author would like to express appreciation to Professor Louis B. Geneva, Cleveland 
State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, for his helpful comments and assistance 
during the preparation of this note. 
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